This paper studies the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs). The key element of the analysis is the "rent dissipation" that these arrangements induce: by eliminating intra-bloc trade barriers, an FTA lowers the incentives of the local firms to lobby for higher external tariffs, thereby causing a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. The prospect of rent dissipation moderates the governments' willingness to participate in FTAs; they will support only arrangements that are "substantially" welfare improving, and no FTA that reduces national welfare. Accounting for the possibility of political turnover, rent dissipation creates also "strategic" motivations for the formation of FTAs. Specifically, a government facing a high enough probability of losing power may want to form a trading bloc simply to "tie the hands" of its successor. An FTA can affect the likelihood of political turnover as well. If the incumbent party has a known bias toward special interests, commitment to less distortionary policies would reduce its electoral disadvantage; the rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA can serve as the vehicle for such a commitment. In fledgling democracies, an incumbent government can use a free trade agreement also to reduce the likelihood of dictatorial takeover, thus helping "consolidate" democracy.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most visible trends in the international trading system in recent years has been the proliferation of regional trade agreements. In the period 1948-1994, the GATT received 124 notifications of regional trade agreements from both large and small, developed and less developed, countries. Recently, over 100 additional arrangements were notified to the WTO since its inception in 1995. Not surprisingly then a relatively large literature exists addressing this trend and evaluating its welfare implications. Little of this work, however, has explored the possibility that the "economics of politics" may be at least partially responsible for this proliferation of trade agreements. This paper investigates how and why "politics" can matter to the willingness of a country to enter into a free trade agreement.
To do so I adopt a relatively standard and simple modeling environment. The analysis is undertaken in a partial equilibrium oligopolistic setting where markets are segmented and entry is abstracted from. The governments' decisions regarding trade policy are shaped by both national welfare concerns and industry contributions, being modeled similarly to Grossman and Helpman (1994) . The analysis proceeds by evaluating the political viability of free trade areas (FTAs) under various scenarios. 1 Despite several similarities in model structure with earlier research, the results I obtain are very different. For example, in contrast to the earlier literature showing how politically motivated governments may have a penchant for welfare reducing trade arrangements, I show just the reverse. Any politically viable free trade agreement (i.e., any individually rational agreement for a contribution loving government) will also be overall welfare enhancing. Moreover, while others have argued that an FTA is likely to promote lobbying for protection against the (excluded) rest of the world, I show that it actually lowers lobbying for tariffs against excluded countries.
When I move to a setting with voting and political turnover, other new results arise. In contrast to the common view that FTAs can play a role in solving time inconsistency problems by tying the hands of incumbent governments, I show that FTAs play a role in tying the hands of one's opponents in future periods. And instead of a benevolent government employing an FTA to tie its own hands in future periods, I find that a government very biased towards special interests has a strong incentive to adopt an FTA to ensure a continuation of their political rents in future periods. Finally, I demonstrate a possible role for FTAs in reducing political turbulence and deterring dictatorships.
In these, and in the remaining results of the paper, a key driving force is what I will refer to as the "rent dissipation effect." This effect has not been identified in the existing literature. In fact, the novelty of my results follows precisely because the previous literature eliminated its workings by assumption. This paper introduces the rent dissipation effect and carries through its logical implications for the political viability of FTAs. 2 In order to understand the rent dissipation effect, it is helpful to start by examining how tariffs are determined. With no FTA in place, the logic of tariff determination is simple.
Contributions by special interests induce the government to set the country's import tariffs above the welfare maximizing level. These higher import tariffs shift market share from foreign firms to their domestic counterparts and shift surplus from consumers to producers through the higher local price the tariff causes. As a result, profits of the domestic firm are enhanced. This is, of course, the reason why special interests are willing to pay for the protectionist policies.
An FTA eliminates tariffs between its members, thereby enhancing exports within the bloc and giving the firms from the other partner countries a greater share in the domestic market. A higher tariff against outside countries would then shift market share and consumer surplus to both domestic and partner firms. Having now to share the benefits of a higher tariff with the firms from the other FTA members, the domestic firms become less willing to compensate the government for higher external tariffs on excluded countries. The FTA then generates lower external tariffs and less lobbying, thus inducing a reduction in the volume of rents created in the lobbying process: hence the name "rent dissipation." Anticipating these effects, and recognizing that lower rents implies lower contributions, a politically motivated government will adopt only FTAs that raise national welfare sufficiently enough to compensate for the lower rents.
This result is at odds with the findings of some other researchers, including Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Krishna (1998) . They argue that politically motivated governments are more likely to form preferential arrangements when they reduce national welfare, as a result of pervasive rent-creating trade diversion. The fundamental reason behind the conflicting results in this paper and in those papers is the treatment of external tariffs, which the latter take as exogenously given.
But as we saw above, it is precisely the endogeneity of these tariffs that allows for the rent dissipation effect. By disregarding this endogeneity, earlier authors essentially shut down the rent dissipation effect. The absence of this effect understates the welfare gains induced by FTAs and distorts the relationship between the political feasibility and the national welfare impact of FTAs. 3 Even in models with endogenous external tariffs, the impact of rent dissipation on lobbying efforts and tariff formation has been overlooked. In fact, Bhagwati (1993) suggests just the opposite should happen -i.e., that a preferential trade agreement should enhance lobbying against outsiders. In response to this, Panagariya and Findlay (1996) argue that by making lobbying against the other members redundant, an FTA releases labor and lowers the economy's wages. Lower wages then make it cheaper to lobby against non-members. Thus, taking the benefits of such lobbying to be constant, they find that an FTA induces more lobbying and more protection against the rest of the world.
Hence, the Panagariya-Findlay result relies on both the presence of general equilibrium factor market effects arising from reduced lobbying, and the assumed absence of rent dissipation effects.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Model details are described in Section 2. Section 3 presents the various elements of the rent dissipation effect. The real analysis begins in Section 4, where I examine the impact of rent dissipation effects on the political viability of FTAs. Assuming initially that incumbent governments are in office permanently, I show that rent dissipation makes governments more "conservative" in the decisions regarding the support of FTAs, implementing only arrangements that are "substantially" welfare improving.
However, since no government is in office forever, I turn to examine the possibility of political turnover in Section 5. 4 In order to introduce political turnover, I extend the model to a 2-period setting where the incumbent faces a fixed probability of being replaced in office. I then show how the prospect of political turnover may turn an otherwise unviable FTA into a politically viable one. This possibility arises because the incumbent government does not acquire any of the rents generated in the political process when it is out of office, but it is still harmed by the welfare consequences of protectionist policies. Accordingly, it wants to constrain the incentives of future 3 Richardson (1993) was the first to recognize that an FTA might induce its members to lower external tariffs.
However, he does not analyze the political viability of free trade agreements, the main issue addressed in this paper. Cadot et al. (2001) do account for the changes in the external tariffs when assessing the viability of FTAs. Their goal is however only to show the existence of an arrangement that is simultaneously welfare improving and politically feasible. 4 To the best of my knowledge, McLaren (2000) is the only other study in the literature of regionalism that accounts for the possibility of political turnover. However, his emphasis is on the choice between free trade areas and customs unions, retaining thus little overlap with this paper. administrations to create rents through inefficient policies. The rent dissipation effect ensures that an FTA is capable of achieving this.
This motivation is similar to that demonstrated in the political economy literature in macroeconomics. As shown there, political competition can induce governments to act strategically to constrain the policy options available to their successors. 5 Similarly, I show in this paper that an incumbent government can use an FTA to ensure that policies will conform to its own preferences even if it is replaced in office by a rival political group. This rationale parallels the line of analysis pursued by Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998) and Mitra (2002) , who also assess the value of trade agreements as a commitment device against time-inconsistent political problems. However, while these authors focus on circumstances in which governments want to constrain their own future choices, I emphasize time inconsistency created by the possibility of political turnover.
The implementation of an FTA may not only reflect the realities of political turnover, however, but it can also determine the likelihood of turnover. Accordingly, I next endogenize the incumbent's probability of remaining in office. I consider two cases. In Section 6, I assume the country in question is a full-fledged mature democracy with a tradition of multi-party politics.
Political turnover is through the ballot box, and hence I introduce a probabilistic voting mechanism to determine turnover. In Section 7, I assume the country in question is a fledgling democracy where political turnover can occur via takeover by authoritarian groups.
In the first case, I demonstrate how an FTA may be used as an instrument to "steal the election platform" of challengers. In particular, a party with a known strong bias toward special interests can credibly commit to less distortionary policies by entering an FTA. This in turn reduces the relative importance of welfare issues on the voters' decisions and raises the probability of the incumbent staying in office. The reason is, again, due to the rent dissipation effect: by reducing the incentives for lobbying, an FTA reduces the electoral disadvantage of a party known to favor special interests.
This result is important to demonstrate how the intuition of Sections 4 and 5 -that only governments weakly attached to rents may want to engage in FTAs -can be reversed when electoral outcomes are endogenous. Albeit at the cost of less rents generated in the subsequent FTA equilibrium, a very much rent-seeking incumbent might adopt an FTA to benefit electorally from "tying its own hands". This result is related to those of Aghion and Bolton (1990) and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , who have employed similar reasoning to analyze the strategic use of debt policies and the choice of exchange-rate regimes, respectively. The key difference is that here rent dissipation is the cause, and the vehicle for commitment is an FTA.
Finally, in Section 7 I consider a situation in which democracy is not yet "consolidated" in a given country, so an authoritarian group considers a takeover. Assuming that the potential dictatorship is "kleptocratic," I demonstrate how an FTA may be useful to prevent such threats to the democratic system. The reason is simple: as an FTA reduces the scope for rents, it reduces the gains from a successful coup while leaving unaltered the costs of a failed takeover attempt. By lessening the potential gains from dictatorial incumbency without altering the costs of an attempt, an FTA can then stabilize a nascent democracy.
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This reasoning is consistent with the timing of numerous accessions to and formations of preferential arrangements. Such a link between democracy and regional integration is often invoked in policy circles as well.
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The analysis in Section 7 provides the first formal analysis of this relationship.
THE BASIC MODEL

A. The Economic Structure
The economic structure of the model parallels Brander's (1981) intra-industry trade model. I consider a 2-sector, N-country economy where one of the sectors is competitive (X) and the other is oligopolistic (Q). Both goods are homogeneous and produced under constant returns to scale technologies: X = L and Q = L/c, where c > 0 is constant and L denotes labor. Labor is the economy's single input, and is inelastically supplied in each country. Thus, choosing X as numeraire, any equilibrium with diversified production requires wages set to unity, with trade taking place only because of oligopolistic behavior in sector Q. 6 Whenever I claim that an FTA may be used to constrain the policies of future governments, democratic or not, I implicitly assume that it is costly enough to reverse the arrangement. The role of irreversibility here parallels the standard assumption, in the literature of the strategic role of public debt, that future governments will honor the country's outstanding debt. I discuss this point further in Section 5, and in Appendix II I show that non-reversibility may actually be regarded as an equilibrium outcome. Yet it is interesting to note that even when authoritarian regimes have gained control of a country that effectively participated in a trade agreement, the arrangement has been honored, as in the case of Swaziland, a member of SACU.
7 For instance, in the last summit congregating all the potential signatories of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, "President Bush said striking down trade barriers was critical to sustaining democracy […] throughout the region" (New York Times, 4/18/2001) . To the extent that can be inferred from public speeches, the other region's leaders shared a very similar view. Similarly, the demand of Eastern and Central European countries for membership in the European Union is also often linked with the countries' democratic concerns.
The analysis is conducted from the perspective of a "home" country, H. Home's population is composed by a continuum of consumers whose size is normalized to one. There is one oligopolistic firm in each country, owned by a negligible fraction of the population. Consumer preferences are represented by X + u(Q), and I assume for simplicity that u(Q) = AQ -Q 2 /2, with A > c. These preferences generate demand Q = A -P for the oligopolistic good, where P denotes consumer's price. The demand for the competitive good is found residually from the consumer's
). The representation is analogous for the other countries, although labor supply and population size may vary across countries.
Each oligopolistic firm has a marginal cost of c when selling in its domestic market, but face specific import tariffs when selling abroad, which add to its marginal cost. Regarding national markets as segmented, I assume firms engage in a Cournot competition in each of these markets, thus choosing sales in each market taking tariffs and the sales of the other firms as given.
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This oligopolistic framework is convenient for several reasons, one of them being the prevention of extreme results that often arise in analyses of FTAs under perfect competition. With perfect competition, differences in consumer prices in conjunction with internal free trade may induce producers to ship all their output to another FTA member (as e.g. in Grossman and Helpman 1995) . In turn, this could stimulate FTA governments to eliminate the external tariffs in those sectors (see Richardson 1993 ). In the model used here, these extreme results do not arisealthough they would only reinforce the conclusions of the paper. Market segmentation and constant marginal costs, by making the sales decisions of each firm independent across markets, ensure that the choice of tariffs in each country (specified below) is independent of the tariffs set elsewhere.
Thus, despite the absence of "small-country" assumptions, governments have "horizontal" reaction functions with respect to the selection of their preferred tariffs. This feature of the model facilitates the analysis considerably.
The present setting is also suitable to capture the ample body of empirical research that is supportive of the pervasiveness of the so-called "pricing-to-market" behavior in international markets, which requires both market segmentation and oligopolistic behavior (see e.g. Goldberg and Knetter 1997) . Specifically to preferential liberalization, the empirical analysis of Winters and Chang (2000) is in full consonance with oligopolistic behavior and market segmentation as well.
The cost symmetry across countries implies that countries choose not to discriminate against distinct sources of imports in the absence of free trade agreements. This assumption, while inconsequential for the results of the paper, prevents unnecessary complications. Nonetheless, in order to prepare the analysis for the introduction of FTAs, I divide the (N -1) foreign countries in two groups: (M -1) "potential partners" and (N -M) "non-members." The home country sets an "external tariff" t e against the latter and an "internal tariff" t i against the former. In each trade regime, these two tariffs determine the equilibrium of the model. There are two possible scenarios: "no FTA," where t i = t e ; and "FTA," where t i = 0; in either case, t e is set optimally. Changes due to the FTA can then be analyzed by comparing the equilibria with t i = 0 and t i = t e .
In any circumstance, firms' sales decisions satisfy the corresponding first order necessary conditions (FONC). Denoting firm j's sales in the home market by q j , its FONC is represented by:
When firm j represents a foreign firm, t j = t e or t i ; if it represents the domestic firm, t j = 0. Summing this condition for all firms, we find:
Using Q = A -P and rearranging this expression, we obtain the market's equilibrium price as a function of tariffs and the other parameters of the model:
Substituting this expression in the FONC of the domestic firm -whose local sales I shall henceforth refer to simply as q(t e , t i ) -, we find:
It is clear from (2.1) and (2.2) that both the local price and the sales of the domestic firm are increasing functions of tariffs.
In the following analysis, the relevant tariff is the external tariff set against the non-member countries, which is determined endogenously and depends on the constraint on t i . Thus, in order to simplify notation, I henceforth denote variables as a function of the external tariff only, denoting the latter simply by t. However, I identify the presence of an FTA by attaching a subscript "M" to all other variables evaluated under a free trade agreement; in the absence of FTAs, no subscripts are assigned. In this section, I present the remaining of the model and the main equilibrium results in the absence of FTAs. However, everything is entirely analogous in the presence of an FTA, the only difference being that all variables would be evaluated at t i = 0, rather than at t i = t e ≡ t.
Defining some additional notation, let the domestic firm's local and export profits be denoted by π(t ) and Π
ROW
, respectively.
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The domestic firm's aggregate profits can then be denoted
. National welfare, W(t), is defined as the sum of consumer's surplus, tariff revenue and producer's aggregate profits, while local welfare is identified as the difference between national welfare and export profits:
B. The Political Structure
The preferences of governments are defined analogously to Grossman and Helpman (1994) , who assume that governments care about both "contributions," denoted here by D, and national welfare. Thus, the preferences of each government are specified as:
where b > 0 is a constant that defines the extent of the government's "political bias:" the higher b, the higher is the government's predilection for contributions, relative to social welfare.
As Grossman and Helpman argue, this specification can be rationalized in many distinct ways.
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Here, when I introduce the possibility of political competition (Section 5), I adopt an interpretation for objective function (2.3) that is more adequate for such a scenario. Nevertheless, until then I simply take this specification as given, as it is typically done in the numerous trade policies analyses that employ it.
The net payoff of the oligopolistic firm, V(t, D), is in turn given by the firm's aggregate profits minus the contributions it gives to the local government, in exchange for higher levels of
A higher local tariff benefits home's oligopolistic firm in two complementary ways:
Expression (2.4) shows that, to the extent that the mark up is strictly positive and that more protection increases local price and the domestic firm's local sales, the firm surely gains from protection. This is of course very standard [and in this model follows from (2.1) and (2.2)], but making it clear helps understand the FTA impact on the political equilibrium, analyzed in the next section.
As in Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998) , I model the interaction between the government and the local firm as a bargaining game, with the "bargaining powers" of the government and the firm being given by α and 1 -α, respectively. Considering the outcome of the bargaining process to be jointly efficient for the two parties, the "political tariff" (t p ) resulting from this interaction must maximize G subject to a given level of V (or vice-versa). It must then be such that: Notice also that the bargaining parameter α does not affect t p . This is a consequence of the transferability of utility between government and firm through contributions. Nevertheless, as I
show below, α does affect the transfer D, which is the instrument that distributes surplus from the lobbying process between the government and the firm.
C. Equilibrium Payoffs
In order to specify each agent's equilibrium payoffs, notice first that in the absence of lobbying the government's best option is to set the tariff at the level that maximizes national welfare,
. The government's reservation utility is therefore W(t * ). Accordingly, when the government has no
]/b from the firm, which is just enough to leave the government at its reservation utility. At the other extreme, when α = 1 the government
SinceV is a constant and the domestic tariff cannot affect export profits, (2.5) follows.
12 It should nonetheless be noted that t * > 0, as a result of terms of trade and strategic motivations.
extracts the whole surplus from the political process, leaving the firm indifferent between lobbying or not. For a generic α, the equilibrium level of contributions is given by:
Substituting (2.6) into the government's objective function, we then obtain:
This expression can be rewritten in a more meaningful way. In order to do that, let what I call henceforth the "political rents" (PR) created in the lobbying process be defined as follows:
The expression in the first parenthesis of (2.8) corresponds to the maximized joint (local) payoff of the government and the firm, while in the second parenthesis the same function is evaluated at t = Using this definition, the government's equilibrium payoff can then be rewritten from (2.7)
simply as:
Hence, the government obtains in equilibrium its reservation utility added by its share of the political rents, weighted in accord to its own preferences. This makes clear that the government does not internalize the welfare distortions due to its use of the political tariff. The firm's equilibrium payoff can be interpreted in an analogous fashion, being expressed as:
FTAS AND RENT DISSIPATION
In this section, I evaluate the impact of an exogenously instituted M-country FTA on the internal political equilibrium of its participants. This evaluation describes how the expected consequences of an FTA depend on the political parameters of its constituent governments and sets the basis for the following sections, where the decision to form FTAs is endogenized. The definition of an FTA used here is standard: an arrangement that eliminates all trade barriers between i ts participants, which nevertheless maintain independent trade policies.
One of the key effects of an FTA is on the sensitivity of the domestic firm's profits to changes in the external tariff. Lemma 1 shows that an FTA makes any marginal increase in the external tariff less effective in enhancing the profits of the domestic firm. This and the other results in this section are proved in Appendix I.
Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 results from the free access the arrangement provides to the partners' firms. By increasing competition and lowering the local price at any given external tariff, this free access reduces the domestic firm's local mark-up. As a result, each unit of market share shifted from outside firms to the domestic firm through higher external tariffs generates less profit to the latter under the FTA than otherwise. The free access provided to the partners' firms under the FTA also reduces the domestic firm's local sales at any given external tariff. Accordingly, the arrangement makes any price increase brought by a higher tariff less valuable for the domestic firm, with part of the benefits from such increase now going to the partners' firms.
Hence, an FTA makes it more difficult to redistribute surplus from the foreign firms and from the local consumers to the domestic producer through higher external tariffs. Since this is the purpose of lobbying, it follows that FTAs reduce the role of the political economy forces in the determination of the country's trade policies. This implies, in particular, that FTAs reduce the difference between the country's "political" and "optimal" tariffs, as Proposition 1 shows.
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Proposition 1: An FTA reduces the difference between its members' political and optimal tariffs; that is, (t
M p -t M * ) < (t p -t * ).
This reduction is larger, the higher are each member's political bias (b).
Proposition 1 follows from the lower responsiveness of the domestic firm's profit to changes in the external tariff under an FTA (Lemma 1). Since profits have a greater importance in 14 In this model, an FTA reduces its members' political external tariffs not only relatively to their optimal tariffs, but also in absolute value. This effect is discussed thoroughly in Ornelas (2002) , but has only secondary relevance in this paper. Nonetheless, since it helps in the proofs of propositions 2 and 3, I prove this claim in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. It should also be noted that other authors, including Richardson (1993) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999a) , have observed as well that FTAs tend to diminish the protectionist forces against non-members. the determination of tariffs when the government is politically motivated [as it follows from (2.5)], the lower responsiveness of profits has greater importance in that case. Therefore, FTAs diminish the difference between the political and optimal external tariffs.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 1 . It depicts four curves, representing a government's FONC for its political (the solid lines) and optimal (the dashed lines) external tariffs with and without an FTA in place. For a given trade regime, the political tariff is always greater than the optimal tariff. However, an FTA reduces the difference between them. shows, in addition, that this effect is more prominent when the member government is more biased toward special interests, indicating that the political ingredient of the external tariffs should be more affected by FTAs in more protectionist administrations.
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15 Bagwell and Staiger (1999b) argue that multilateral agreements negotiated under the aegis of the GATT tend to neutralize inefficiencies due to terms of trade motivations. However, GATT agreements do not remove the political motivations for protection. In the sense that the focus of this paper is precisely on how FTAs affect the political I turn now to the welfare effects of FTAs. It has been widely recognized in the regionalism literature that preferential liberalization has in general ambiguous welfare consequences. This ambiguity is present here as well. The elimination of internal trade barriers and the reduction of external tariffs induced by an FTA increases consumer surplus, but at the cost of lower tariff revenues. Moreover, while free access to the other members' markets increases the domestic firm's export profits, enhanced competition reduces its earnings in the local market.
A thorough welfare assessment would require also the incorporation of other elements in the analysis, such as adjustment and transport costs, asymmetric endowments etc. However, in contrast with most of the regionalism literature, the goal in this paper is not to describe the welfare impact of FTAs, but rather to characterize the relationship between their welfare consequences and political feasibility. What will prove necessary to assess this relationship is the evaluation of how the welfare impact of an FTA is affected by its members' political structures. Proposition 1 indicates that an FTA moderates the role of political economy forces in the determination of tariffs. Since in the present context "politics" has always a deleterious welfare effect, this corresponds to a source of gain for each FTA member. Thus, although the net welfare impact of an FTA is in general ambiguous, the mitigation of the politically motivated distortions induces always a welfare gain, which is more relevant, the more far-reaching are the government's political bias.
Proposition 2: Everything else constant, an FTA improves the welfare of a participating country by more (or reduces it by less), the higher is the government's political bias (b).
This result implies that, all else equal, the countries that obtain the largest welfare gains from an FTA are those where special interest politics are most prevalent.
Proposition 3: An FTA reduces the volume of rents generated in the political process; that is, PR M < PR. This reduction is larger, the higher are the members' political bias (b).
Proposition 3 indicates that an FTA diminishes the rents created in the lobbying process. As the arrangement makes it harder to enhance the profits of the domestic firm through higher external tariffs, it lowers the firm's incentives to lobby. In equilibrium, these lower incentives imply less lobbying and fewer rents available for the government.
This section, in summary, establishes that a free trade agreement diminishes the role of lobbying in the trade policy outcomes. Three related consequences result from that. An FTA induces a reduction in the divergence between the political and the optimal tariffs (Proposition 1);
generates an additional element of welfare gain, relative to those usually considered in the literature (Proposition 2); and decreases the volume of rents created in the political process (Proposition 3).
These results contrast with those of Panagariya and Findlay (1996) , who claim that the formation of an FTA would tend to enhance lobbying against non-members. As I note in the Introduction, the Panagariya-Findlay result relies on two assumptions. First, it depends on the presence of general equilibrium factor market effects arising from reduced lobbying, requiring lobbying activities to be large enough to affect market wages. Moreover, and more importantly, those authors model the benefits from lobbying for protection against foreign imports as a constant, unaltered by the presence of an FTA. However, as shown here, an FTA lowers these gains, inducing as a result less lobbying against non-members.
It is also interesting to note how the present analysis complements the contributions of Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998) and Mitra (2002) . They both show that governments can use a trade agreement to neutralize inefficiencies created by lobbying activities in the economy, but for which governments are not compensated. Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare and Mitra suggest that this motivation may help explain the recent propagation of international trade agreements. However, as they work with 2 -country settings, they do not model discriminatory liberalization, which characterizes most of the existing trade agreements. Nonetheless, the rent dissipation effects, by implying that FTAs constitute a legitimate instrument toward the foreclosure of lobbying activities, suggest that the Maggi-Rodríguez-Clare-Mitra rationale is likely to extend to preferential forms of liberalization as well.
FTAS WITH GOVERNMENTS PERMANENTLY IN OFFICE
Having evaluated the consequences of an FTA on the political equilibrium of a member country, it is now possible to analyze the circumstances under which a government would choose to form an FTA. In this section, I assume the incumbent government remains in command forever. This assumption, adopted by most authors, is evidently restrictive. Nevertheless, it is inconsequential once it is also assumed that governments behave as "social (welfare-maximizer) planners," as it was common in the earlier trade policy literature.
Under the more recent political economy perspective, however, that assumption becomes indeed highly restrictive whenever the policies of the current policymakers can affect the actions of its successors. Nonetheless, treating the government as permanently in office offers a useful benchmark, and it highlights forces that will be at work whenever an FTA is considered. In the subsequent sections, I extend the analysis to situations where there is potential alternation of power.
I assume henceforth that the home government has the opportunity to participate in a free trade agreement with M -1 other countries.
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As in Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998), the government bases its decision on the FTA anticipated impact on national welfare and political rents, endorsing the agreement if and only if it improves upon the government's equilibrium payoff in the absence of the FTA. With G defined as in (2.9), and letting
the government's payoff under the agreement, this condition can be represented as G M > G. Now, in order to facilitate notation, let the change in any variable due to the FTA be represented, in equilibrium, by a subscript "∆M." Thus, with W l ∆M (b) and W l ∆M (b=0) denoting, respectively, the FTA actual impact on local welfare and the impact it would have had on local welfare were the government not politically motivated, condition G M > G becomes:
, as the FTA increases the export profits in the partners' markets without altering them in the non-members' markets. On the other hand,
and PR ∆M < 0 17 This choice can be seen from two distinct perspectives. In one, the home government is critical to launch the free trade agreement in question, so the arrangement is formed if and only if the government agrees so. An example of this case would be the U.S. in the establishment of NAFTA. Under the other view, the government chooses only its participation in an existing arrangement. An example of this case would be the accessions to the European Free Trade Association. In the context of the present model, the only formal distinction between these two perspectives concerns the level of the country's export profits when it stays out of the agreement (Π
ROW
). Yet the analysis is qualitatively identical for both cases. For this reason, I refer to the two views interchangeably throughout the text. 18 If b = 0, the government chooses tariffs to maximize local welfare. However, under an FTA it is constrained by the restriction of zero tariffs against the other members. Therefore, the FTA reduces local welfare when b = 0.
(Proposition 3). There is however no general presumption about condition (4.1); it may hold or not, depending on both the number and on the specific characteristics of the countries involved in the arrangement. In turn, the condition under which the FTA is welfare-improving is given by: Proof: Proposition 2 asserts that, for anyb and b such that b > b,
Hence, for any b > 0,
Proposition 3, on the other hand, establishes that PR∆M < 0. Thus, adding (αbPR∆M) to the right-hand-side of (4.4) does not alter the inequality:
Expression (4.5) shows that the left-hand-side of (4.2) is greater than the left-hand-side of (4.1). Thus, (4.1) ⇒ (4.2). Hence, as the government enters in the FTA whenever condition (4.1) holds, but the FTA is welfare-improving only if condition (4.2) is satisfied, the government never endorses welfare-reducing FTAs.
On the other hand, (4.5) is compatible with an FTA such that: 6) in which case the FTA is welfare-enhancing but is not politically viable. Note, in addition, that Proposition 3
< 0, so the right-hand-side of (4.6) is decreasing in both b and α. In contrast, Proposition 2 asserts that the left-hand-side of (4.6), which is independent of α, is increasing in b. Thus, either a higher b or a higher α enlarges the set of parameters satisfying (4.6). < Proposition 4 indicates that governments appraise FTAs inevitably more pessimistically than a welfare-maximizer entity would. The reason is two-fold. First, the lower political rents available under FTAs (Proposition 3) reduce the attractiveness of these arrangements for governments.
Moreover, governments do not fully internalize the welfare benefits of FTAs: being compensated by the distortions introduced in the economy, they ignore the gains due to the mitigation of the politically motivated distortions (Proposition 2). Because of these two reasons, governments sponsor only arrangements that "substantially" improve national welfare -that is, those that improve it by at
. Hence, political economy forces limit the viability of FTAs to fewer circumstances than it would be socially optimal. In particular, there may be situations in which condition (4.6) holds, so the FTA is welfare-improving but is not politically viable. As the proposition indicates, this bias toward the support of too few FTAs is more relevant when governments are more politically motivated and/or have stronger bargaining positions vis-à-vis the private sector in the division of the political rents.
The more striking result in Proposition 4 is, however, that welfare-reducing preferential arrangements are never politically viable. While this result follows straightforwardly from propositions 2 and 3 -which, as argued above, imply that governments support only arrangements that improve national welfare "substantially" -, it stands in stark contrast with the findings of Grossman and Helpman (1995) and Krishna (1998) , who suggest that governments tend to create mainly welfare-reducing arrangements. This distinction, as indicated in the outset, is due essentially to their exogenous treatment of the external tariffs, which shuts down the rent dissipation effects and therefore neglects their consequences for the political viability of FTAs.
FTAS WITH POLITICAL TURNOVER
I now consider how the possibility of political turnover affects the political viability of free trade agreements. In order to undertake the analysis, I first present a rationale that is needed to harmonize the government's preferences, as specified in expression (2.3), with a political environment marked by political competition. I adopt such a perspective henceforth.
I consider that political groups/parties seek power because there are rents for holding office.
Here, as the private sector makes transfers to the government only in order to influence policies, these transfers are considered specific to incumbency. This perspective differs from the approach that interprets transfers as campaign contributions that can be acquired by incumbents and contenders alike, as e.g. in Grossman and Helpman (1996) . In that case, transfers are not beneficial per se, but rather because they enhance the electoral prospects of politicians, whose gains from being elected correspond to intangible benefits that are unrelated with the contributions received. By contrast, while recognizing the importance of campaign financing, other authors acknowledge that those in office, in a position to actually enact policies, usually obtain additional benefits from their interaction with lobbies. A recent paper that takes this view and finds "office rents" as an equilibrium result is Besley and Coate (2001) .
Political parties care about national welfare as well. As in the literature of strategic debt issuance, I consider that a party's welfare concerns reflect the links with its "constituency." In the present model, the constituency of a political party can be understood simply as a fraction of the population. Specifying the relative weight attached to social welfare in the government's objective function as a strictly increasing function of this share, a given distorting policy would be more costly for the government the larger is its constituency. Thus, a broader representation would induce the government to internalize a larger part of the distortions created by its policies. Adopting this interpretation, I show that the prospects of political turnover may turn an otherwise politically unviable FTA into a politically viable one. This is possible because the incumbent government, when out of power, does not receive any of the lobbying-related rents. In that instance it would therefore surely benefit from a decline in the trade distortions. Since FTAs help constrain welfare-distorting political activities, a government expecting to leave office in the near future might as a result want to establish an FTA only to constrain the succeeding ruling party. 19 More specifically, denoting the share of the population representing the government's constituency by s ≤ 1, let there be a function f(s) satisfying f'(.) > 0, lim f(s → 0) = 0 and lim f(s → 1) = ∞. The specific form of this function would depend on both the degree of leniency of the institutional constraints against making "protection for sale" and the level of frictions existing in the negotiations with the import-competing firms. The government's objective function could then be specified
as G(t, D) = W(t) + D/f(s) -that is, just as in (2.3), with b defined as b ≡ 1/f(s).
This is shown with a simple 2-period, 2-party extension of the previous framework. In this section, I assume the probability of reelection is given by a fixed parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1]. If the incumbent party loses power, its rival party takes office. In order to highlight the new elements that come into play when political uncertainty is introduced, I focus on period 2 payoffs. This is equivalent to assuming that the FTA would take place only in the end of period 1, although the analysis would be entirely analogous if the arrangement were formed earlier in period 1.
Naturally, an FTA can be used to affect future policies only if its reversal is costly enough to inhibit withdrawal from the arrangement by future governments. For simplicity, in the main text I assume the FTA in question is irreversible. Consider then how the possibility of political turnover affects an incumbent party's assessment of FTAs. In period 2, if it keeps power, the situation is identical to the case analyzed in the previous section, so a given FTA is worth:
for incumbent party A, where identifier A is used henceforth to distinguish the incumbent government. Conversely, if party A loses power, it values the FTA only to the extent that the arrangement affects national welfare, so in that case the FTA is worth:
for party A, where identifier B identifies the incumbent's rival party. Hence, with political turnover possible, the incumbent's criterion to adopt an FTA becomes:
Proposition 5 establishes how this distinct perspective alters the political feasibility of an FTA. 20 It is worth pointing out that irreversibility is coherent with history, as arrangements de facto implemented are rarely turned down later on. The only exceptions to this rule seem to have occurred in Central America (CACM) and in the Caribbean (CARIFTA/CARICOM). After effective implementation during the 1960's, these arrangements were disrupted during the debt crisis of the 1980's. Nevertheless, both were fully reactivated in the early 1990's.
Proposition 5: The possibility of political turnover can turn an otherwise politically unfeasible FTA into a viable one. The set of parameters under which this happens is larger the higher is the probability of turnover (i.e., the lower is ρ). By contrast, the possibility of turnover cannot render unfeasible an otherwise feasible FTA.
Proof: Note that
, with the first inequality following from Proposition 3 and the second from Proposition 2. Therefore,
, proving the last claim in the proposition. On the other hand, we may have: However, if the incumbent believes reelection is unlikely, the loss of rents would tend to be incurred only by its successor. The gains from less distortion could then prevail in the incumbent's assessment, inducing it to implement the agreement. In that sense, the incumbent uses the FTA as if it wanted to "tie the hands" of its successor.
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These strategic motivations are of course greater when the incumbent's chances of holding office are lower. In this sense, "political instability" tends to incite the establishment of free trade agreements.
A higher parameter b B tends to make condition (5.4) hold more easily as well. The reason being that, when party B is more biased toward special interests, it creates a prospect of larger distortions. In that case, the role of FTAs moderating distortions and enhancing welfare is magnified (Proposition 2), making the incumbent more inclined to use an FTA to limit the rent-seeking activities of its potential successor. Conversely, if the incumbent government is itself very sensitive to the politically generated rents, or else if its bargaining power vis-à-vis the private sector in the division of rents is relatively large, the incumbent would be less willing to forgo the possibility to obtain rents in order to prevent future distortions. This can be seen by noting that G ∆M A is decreasing in both α A and b A , as indicated in the proof of Proposition 4. Therefore, by making the current government more sensitive to reductions in the political rents, either a higher b A or a higher α A makes it less prone to promote
FTAs.
An important implication of the strategically supported FTAs studied in this section is that, as those endorsed for non-strategic reasons (analyzed in the previous section), they too enhance (expected) national welfare. Therefore, under a fixed probability of reelection, political competition enhances efficiency in the decision to adopt FTAs. . If W ∆M A < 0, the arrangement could reduce period 2's national welfare in case the incumbent keeps power.
Figure 2 -Efficiency Gain in FTA Decision Caused by the Possibility of Political Turnover
As indicated in the outset, the idea that governments can manipulate state variables to constrain their successors' choices is not novel. Prominent examples are the pioneering contributions of Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Persson and Svensson (1989) , who employ such a rationale to study the politics of debt issuance. One of the key insights from that line of research is that political competition may induce a government to take measures that increase the cost of policies that its successor might want to pursue, but which the incumbent would like to prevent.
Here, a similar reasoning is employed to show that a government faced with the prospect of being replaced might want to limit the ability of its successor to create rents through interactions with the domestic industry. An FTA is shown to be an effective tool towards such foreclosure.
It should be noted, however, that there are also important differences between the approaches pursued here and in the strategic debt literature. For instance, whereas heterogeneous preferences for the competing political groups/parties are typically central for the results in that line of research,
24
I require no heterogeneity in the preferences of distinct political groups.
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Instead, what is necessary to create a strategic motive for the establishment of an FTA is the existence of "office rents," which generate incentives for an incumbent party expecting to leave power to foreclose future welfare distorting rent creating policies.
There is also a fundamental distinction between the welfare consequences of "binding the successor's hands" here and in the strategic debt literature. The typical finding in the latter is that political competition tends to introduce "strategic inefficiencies" in the policymaking process, because political competition would prevent governments from fully internalizing the welfare impact of their policies.
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In this paper, by contrast, as political competition compels governments to internalize a larger part of the welfare consequences of a trade agreement, it generates "strategic efficiencies," being thus helpful from a social standpoint.
FTAS WITH ENDOGENOUS PROBABILITY OF REELECTION
As hand, base their choices on two dimensions: (1) "welfare prospects," which depend on the welfare impact of the policies to be enacted by the elected government; and (2) "non-economic issues,"
25 I actually allow the two political parties to have distinct preferences, as the potentially distinct parameters b and α indicate. But while this provides additional flexibility to the model, it is not required for Propositions 5 and 6. 26 In Alesina and Tabellini (1990) , e.g., the incumbent government tends to accumulate debt beyond the socially optimal level in order to raise the cost of the funds necessary to finance the successor's preferred public spending policy. Cukierman et al. (1992) use similar rationale to explain why governments postpone welfare-improving tax reforms.
representing exogenous or non-economic aspects of public policy that are relevant to these voters.
Allowing their preferences to differ with respect to the latter, they vote heterogeneously.
Specifically, let each unattached voter i cast his vote for party A if and only if: Provided that not all unattached electors vote for the same party, there is a "swing voter," i * , whose parameter µ i* is such that:
Voters with subject-specific parameter µ i > µ i* vote for A, whereas those with subject-specific parameter µ i ≤ µ i* vote for B. Thus, the fraction of unattached voters who choose A is given by: . Hence, party A is reelected with probability ρ = prob{ν A ≥ ½}. After some rearranging, this probability can be rewritten as: Consequently, party A can be reelected only if it is sufficiently more popular than party B in the non-economic issues -that is, only if η is positive and sufficiently large.
Expression (6.5) makes the factors improving party A's reelection prospects clear: a smaller disadvantage in terms of constituency sizes, ( s B -s A ); a larger fraction and/or more dense distribution of unattached voters, φ(1 -s B -s A ); and a greater advantage in the non-economic issues (η). In this simple probabilistic voting model with rational and informed voters, these are however all fixed parameters from the perspective of the political parties. Accordingly, the incumbent party is unable to alter its reelection prospects unless it can credibly commit to implement distinct policies. I now show that an FTA can play the role of such a credible commitment device.
In this context, an FTA alters ρ through its effect on ∆. By reducing the incentives of any government to distort the economy, the arrangement reduces party A's disadvantage in that respect.
This shifts the election's probabilistic outcome toward party A. Proposition 7 proves this claim.
Proposition 7: By engaging the country in an FTA, Party A lowers ∆, thereby enhancing its own electoral chances.
Proof: It follows directly from (6.5) that a reduction in ∆ improves ρ. Hence, what remains to be shown is that an FTA decreases ∆. This happens iff:
Since bB < bA by assumption, this is true from Proposition 2. < Proposition 7 illustrates a commitment role played by an FTA that is distinct from the one analyzed in the previous section. Rather than "tying its successor's hands," now the incumbent government can use an FTA to "tie its own hands," as that improves its likelihood of electoral success. The argument relies essentially on the electors viewing the incumbent party as relatively weak in one of the electorally relevant dimensions. If the incumbent is able to credibly reduce its disadvantage on that issue, it improves its own electoral prospects. The proposition shows that an FTA is a possible instrument toward such a commitment.
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Even in that case, however, it may not be worthwhile for the incumbent party to implement the FTA. The interesting case occurs when it is against the arrangement in the absence of strategic motivations. The incumbent party A would then need to weight the gain from an increased prospect of reelection against the loss from having the FTA in place. The condition under which it supports the arrangement then becomes:
where ρ M (> ρ) denotes party A's probability of reelection with the FTA in place. The left-hand-side (right-hand-side) of (6.6) represents the incumbent's expected utility with (without) the FTA.
27 Milesi-Ferretti (1995) applies similar rationale to explain the choice of exchange-rate regimes and the degree of Central Bank independence in a scenario where right and left wing parties compete for office.
Denoting the increase in the reelection probability due to the FTA by ρ ∆M ≡ ρ M -ρ and
] from both sides of (6.6), the latter can be rewritten as:
The left-hand-side of (6.6') displays the FTA impact on party A's expected payoff when the arrangement does not alter ρ. This is the case analyzed in the previous section, where I assert that an FTA would be supported for purely strategic reasons if that expression were positive. Now, party
A's incentives to adopt the FTA are enhanced by the arrangement's effect on the probability of reelection. Accordingly, even if the FTA reduced party A's expected payoff under a fixed ρ, the FTA can benefit party A if it enhances the latter's chances of keeping office sufficiently enough.
This can be seen by noting that the right-hand-side of (6.6') is unambiguously negative, since 
Proof:
The condition under which the government supports the FTA, given in (6.6), can be rewritten as:
whereas the condition under which the FTA is welfare-improving (in expected terms) is equivalent to:
Note that the right-hand-side of these two expressions is identical. Suppose then that, as before, the arrangement enhances welfare whenever the government supports it. If so, we would need:
Using the definition of ρ ∆M and adding and subtracting 
which is equivalent to:
The left-hand-side of this expression is positive from propositions 2 and 3, but the right-hand-side is also positive. Thus, if ρM is large enough relative to ρ, the inequality will not hold, contradicting the assumption that the arrangement enhances welfare whenever the government supports it. <
The intuition of Proposition 8 is straightforward. Because of the "office rents," governments benefit from incumbency. If an FTA enhances the probability by which a party will acquire these rents in the future, it can make that party too eager to adopt the arrangement, vis-à-vis the socially optimal decision. This bias contrasts with the bias created by the rent dissipation effect, which reduces governments' willingness to enter in FTAs relatively to the socially optimum. The net effect will depend on the relative magnitudes.
It is worth noting that the potential "excess of incentives" to institute an FTA is driven by the assumption that the incumbent is more rent-seeker than its contender. I focus on this case because of the distinct nature of FTAs that can become politically viable in this situation, but it should be clear that the opposite outcome would arise if the assumption regarding the inclination of the two parties toward special interest politics were reversed. In that case, the bias toward too little incentives to enter in an FTA introduced by the rent dissipation effect would be reinforced further. 
, and the change in the criterion due to the FTA effect on the probability of reelection,
. In addition, the figure displays the FTA expected welfare impact and its two components: the impact when ρ = ρ M ,
, and the change in the welfare impact due to the FTA effect on the reelection
. Note that the FTA depicted reduces expected national welfare unambiguously. This is partially due to the electoral support the FTA provides to the more Although Proposition 3 assures that FTAs reduce the rents generated in the political process, the arrangement can enhance the rents of the current government if it alters the identity of the future office holder. If ρ ∆M is large enough to increase the incumbent's expected rents, welfare-reducing FTAs can then become politically viable, as illustrated in Figure 3 when b A > u. Figure 3 -Potential "Excess of Incentives" for Adoption of an FTA
In addition to the line of research that focuses on the manipulation of state variables for electoral purposes, emphasized in the Introduction, the rationale pursued in this section relates also to the literature of strategic delegation, which emphasizes that agents can delegate responsibilities to another party in order to circumvent time inconsistent policy problems. In that circumstance, it is also best for the agents to "tie their own hands." This reasoning has been applied for example to monetary policies (Rogoff 1985) and to the capital levy problem (Persson and Tabellini 1994) .
Welfare implications in that line of research and here are, however, entirely distinct. While the strategic delegation literature shows that a government's commitment to tie its own hands can solve inefficiency problems, I show that it reduces the expected welfare consequences of FTAs and can even turn an otherwise politically infeasible welfare-reducing FTA into a feasible one.
We have therefore identified two distinct channels through which the existence of political competition enhances the political feasibility of free trade agreements. First, the prospects of turnover make the loss of political rents due to an FTA less significant for the incumbent government. Moreover, an FTA can improve the incumbent's reelection prospects.
FTAS AS INSURANCE AGAINST AN AUTHORITARIAN TAKEOVER
I show in this section that free trade agreements can also play a role in preventing political disruption by authoritarian groups. This type of analysis is relevant whenever a country has not yet "consolidated its democracy," meaning that the institutions that make the breakdown of a democratic system prohibitively costly (free press, autonomous judicial system, well-established property rights and the like) are not solid enough in the country.
I assume the potential dictatorial group cares predominantly about its own well-being. That is, rather than considering the potential dictatorship as "benevolent," as often assumed in economic analyses, I treat it as "kleptocratic." Moreover, since the supporting group of a dictatorship tends to be considerably smaller than that of a democratic ruling party, the motives limiting rent-seeking behavior are considered weaker for the dictatorship. In terms of specification (2.3), this perspective implies that the weight put on rents is higher for dictatorships than for democratic governments.
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Suppose then that an authoritarian group is considering an attempt to subvert the country's democratic order. Modeling such a problem as simply as possible, I assume that, if the takeover attempt is successful, the group imposes a dictatorship in the country and obtains its office payoff,
(where the identifier D stands for dictatorship). By contrast, if it is unsuccessful, the group bears a fixed cost of K > 0.
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The probability of a successful takeover, which depends on the stability of the country's democratic institutions, is p s . In nations with enduring democratic tradition, where the rule of law is strong, it tends to be insignificantly low, virtually precluding the possibility of political disruption. However, in countries lacking solid institutions, where the rule of law is weak and democracy has not yet "consolidated," p s can be significantly higher, thus opening a tangible opportunity for successful coups.
Knowing these parameters, the (risk-neutral) authoritarian group attempts to takeover if and only if its expected utility from the endeavor is positive. That is, iff:
or equivalently, iff:
In a consolidated democracy, where p s is close to zero, it is clear from (7.1') that an attempt against the county's democratic system would happen only if the costs of failure were substantially 28 This presumption has empirical support. Nalin and Torstensson (1997) , for instance, find that dictatorships are more likely than democracies to pursue distortionary redistributive policies. Specifically to trade policies, Banerji and Ghanem (1997) and Rama (1994) present evidence that authoritarian regimes are associated with increased trade protection and trade regulations. Mitra et al. (2001) , estimating welfare and contributions' weights for Turkey in periods of both democratic and authoritarian administrations, provide additional support for the presumption that, relative to special interests, welfare concerns are more important for democracies than for dictatorships. 29 Parameter K should be regarded as a proxy for the many kinds of penalties that could apply in such a caseincarceration, extradition, death and the like. low. Since this is usually not the case anywhere, the country's political system would then be safely protected. Conversely, a democracy with underdeveloped democratic institutions (high p s ) typically has the stability of its political system at risk.
Nevertheless, for a given pair (p s , K) >> 0, the authoritarian group attempts to subvert the country's democratic system if its payoff in office, G D , is large enough to make condition (7.1') hold.
Besides b D , the other factor that increases G D is a higher α D . Because of the aptitude of authoritarian administrations to resort to violence to settle conflict, this bargaining power vis-à-vis the private sector in the division of the political rents tends to be higher under dictatorships than under democracies as well.
In this framework, an FTA may critically reduce the incentives of the authoritarian group to attempt a takeover. Proposition 3 indicates that an FTA diminishes political rents more effectively when the government's political bias is higher. Furthermore, this reduction is more critical for the government when it cares more about rents (b is higher) and when it acquires a larger share of the political rents ( α is higher). We still need to ask, however, whether the incumbent democratic government would actually want to implement the arrangement. It can be argued that, for purely ideological reasons, it would. But this can be true also within the narrower perspective of the model used here. First, applying the rationale of Section 5, the FTA could be useful to the incumbent party even when the breakdown of the democratic system seems inevitable. Since it cares about the well being of its constituency, the forward-looking incumbent could institute the FTA aiming to mitigate the distortions that a dictatorship would tend to introduce in the economy. Moreover, as the rationale developed in Section 6 indicates, the incumbent is more likely to support an FTA if the arrangement increases its likelihood of keeping power. Since the institution of a dictatorship is likely to be especially harmful to the prospects of a democratic party in regaining power, that argument is strengthened further under the threat of a dictatorial takeover.
This reasoning suggests, therefore, that an FTA might be useful to prevent the breakdown of democracy when it is not yet fully consolidated. Nascent democracies are probably the most prominent candidates to display this characteristic, given the unstable political periods that typically follow the end of dictatorial regimes. There is, in fact, considerable anecdotal evidence linking the creation of preferential trade agreements to the establishment of new democracies. This was the case, for example, of all Mercosur members, of Greece, Portugal and Spain in their accession to the European Community, and of the EU agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The European Community was itself established few years after the end of autocrat regimes in some of its original members (Germany and Italy). Likewise, the consolidation of democratic regimes is often presented as one of the primary goals of the potential free trade area of the Americas, aggregating at times even more attention than the main trade issues. 31 Naturally, a systematic empirical evaluation is still needed to establish the validity of the relationship between nascent democracies and the establishment of free trade agreements. 32 Similarly, the role of rent dissipation effects in paving this relationship also needs a quantitative assessment. Nevertheless, the present analysis fills a gap in the literature by providing a (so far 31 As The Economist (4/19/2001) points out, "the elected leaders of Latin America look to the United States as an export market but also as a source of support for democracy in the region."
32 Mansfield et al. (2002) take one step towards such evaluation, showing that pairs of democratic countries are more likely to create trade agreements than pairs in which at least one country has an authoritarian political regime. Pevehouse (2001) shows in addition that participation in international organizations (which include mainly free trade agreements but also other international organizations) tends indeed to increase the longevity of new democracies. absent) formal explanation for the link between democratic consolidation and participation if free trade agreements.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper shows that the "economics of politics" are critical to understand the political viability of a free trade agreement. The key driving force in the analysis is the "rent dissipation" that an FTA generates. Because an FTA lowers the incentives for lobbying against imports from nonmember countries, it induces a reduction of the rents created in the lobbying process. This reduction, being anticipated by the governments, turns them more "conservative" in their decisions to participate in FTAs. Abstracting from political competition issues, this implies that some welfareimproving arrangements shall not gain political support, but ensures that no welfare-reducing FTA will become politically feasible either.
The analysis becomes richer when political competition is incorporated. Despite political turnover being one of the central characteristics of democratic systems, its relationship with the viability of free trade agreements has not yet been addressed in the literature. The framework of this paper appears particularly adequate for such an analysis, as the possibility of political turnover alters the implications of the rent dissipation effect. Modeling political turnover in three related ways, representing distinct circumstances under which this sort of uncertainty may affect the political feasibility of FTAs, I show that rent dissipation creates in this context "strategic" motivations for the adoption of FTAs. Overall, the analysis indicates that one must account for such an uncertainty in order to fully understand the political determinants of FTAs.
Although the findings in the paper are presented primarily as a contribution to the theory of preferential trade agreements, I emphasize that they are also closely related to the line of research that studies the consequences of political uncertainty more broadly. That literature has evaluated the impact of political instability on e.g. the management of debt, the timing of tax reforms and the viability of stabilization programs. Here, I show that political instability can be useful to explain the timing and the consequences of FTAs as well.
Interestingly, the analysis indicates that the effects of political uncertainty on the viability of FTAs, in contrast with the typical findings in the macroeconomic applications, can be "benign:" the possibility of political turnover can induce the creation of otherwise unfeasible welfare-enhancing FTAs, which limit the adoption of distortionary trade policies, and may even help "consolidate" unstable democracies. Yet I do not intend to provide here an exhaustive examination of the relationship between political uncertainty and the viability of free trade agreements; the aim is, rather, to provide the initial step toward such understanding. The need of further theoretical research to investigate these links in more detail, as well as formal evaluations of their overall empirical significance, is certainly warranted.
However, it follows from (2.1) and (2.2) that the changes in both the price level and the sales of the domestic firm due to a higher external tariff are independent of the internal tariff; hence, they are unaffected by the constraint setting ti = 0 under the FTA. The expression above can then be rewritten as:
The constraint ti = 0 does affect, however, the level of those two variables. As it is clear from (2. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
In order to prove Proposition 1, the following lemma is necessary.
, where k is a constant.
Proof: From the first order necessary condition of the domestic firm and of a generic foreign firm j, we have that q j = q -tj. Thus, the equilibrium sales of a foreign firm in a potential FTA member country and in a nonmember country can be represented, respectively, as q(te, ti) -ti and q(te, te) -te. Accounting for that, we can rewrite the objective function in (2.5) as: do not discuss the plausibility of these costs, rather remitting the reader to McLaren's discussion.
Nevertheless, I note that these costs could also be taken as a proxy of the various costs related to the introduction/termination of a preferential arrangement, e.g. the costs related to the sectoral adjustments typically required in those circumstances.
Thus, let λ (λ u ) denote the negotiating costs that a government has to incur in order to have its country participating in (out of) an FTA, where both λ and λ u are positive constants measured in terms of the numeraire good. Accounting for that, the condition required for "strategically adopted" FTAs, paralleling condition (5.4), becomes: Clearly, the existence of negotiating costs reduces the general attractiveness of FTAs -as expected.
Nevertheless, the logic behind an arrangement established for strategic reasons remains virtually unaltered. It is also worth noting that, although both λ and λ u are likely to be significant, equilibrium non-reversibility could be ensured even if one of them were zero.
